Abstract. Privacy-preserving data publication for data mining is to protect sensitive information of individuals in published data while the distortion to the data is minimized. Recently, it is shown that (α, k)-anonymity is a feasible technique when we are given some sensitive attribute(s) and quasi-identifier attributes. In previous work, generalization of the given data table has been used for the anonymization. In this paper, we show that we can project the data onto two tables for publishing in such a way that the privacy protection for (α, k)-anonymity can be achieved with less distortion. In the two tables, one table contains the undisturbed non-sensitive values and the other table contains the undisturbed sensitive values. Privacy preservation is guaranteed by the lossy join property of the two tables. We show by experiments that the results are better than previous approaches.
Introduction
Privacy-preserving data mining is about preserving the individual privacy and retaining as much as possible the information in a dataset to be released for mining. The perturbation approach [2] and the k-anonymity model [14, 13, 4, 1] are two major techniques for this goal.
The k-anonymity model assumes a quasi-identifier (QID), which is a set of attributes that may serve as an identifier in the data set. In the simplest case, it is assumed that the dataset is a table and that each tuple corresponds to an individual. For example, in Table 1 Table 3 . An (0.5,2)-anonymous data set of Table 1 by local recoding birth are recorded. It is found that a high percentage of the population can be uniquely identified by the gender, date of birth and the zip code [12] .
Let Q be the quasi-identifier (QID). An equivalence class set, called a QID-EC, for the same QID value of a table with respect to Q is a collection of all tuples in the table containing identical values of Q. For instance, Table 2 contains two QID-EC's. The first QID-EC contains the first two and the last two tuples because these tuples contain identical values of Q. Similarly, the second QID-EC contains the third and the fourth record.
A data set D is k-anonymous with respect to Q if the size of every QID-EC with respect to Q is k or more. As a result, it is less likely that any tuple in the released table can be linked to an individual and thus personal privacy is preserved. For example, each QID-EC in Table 2 has a size equal to or greater than 2. If k = 2, the data set in Table 2 is said to be k-anonymous.
We assume that each attribute follows a generalization hierarchy. In this hierarchy, a value in a lower level has a more specific meaning compared with a value in a higher level. For instance, Figure 1 shows a generalization hierarchy of attribute job.
In order to achieve k-anonymity, we generalize some values in some attributes in the quasi-identifier by replacing the values in a lower level by the values in a higher level according to the generalization hierarchy. Table 2 is a generalization of Table 1 .
(α, k)-anonymity
The k-anonymity model is proposed in order to prevent the re-identification of individuals in the released data set. However, it does not consider the inference relationship from the quasi-identifier to some sensitive attribute. We assume for simplicity that there is only one sensitive attribute and that some values of this attribute are sensitive values. Suppose all tuples in a QID-EC contain the same sensitive value in the released data set, even though the size of the QID-EC is greater than or equal to k, all tuples in this QID-EC are linked to this sensitive value in the released data set. Therefore, each individual that has the corresponding QID value will be linked to the sensitive value. Let us call such an attack an inference attack. In order to overcome this attack, [9, 17] proposed some privacy models and methods. [9] and [17] proposed an l-diversity model and an (α, k)-anonymity model, respectively, where α is a real number ∈ [0, 1] and k and l are positive integers. As discussed in [17] , it is difficult for users to set the parameters in the l-diversity model. In this paper, we focus on the (α, k)-anonymity model, which generates publishable data that is free from the inference attack. In addition to k-anonymity, this model requires that the value of the frequency (in fraction) of any sensitive value in any QID-EC is no more than α after anonymization.
There are two possible schemes of generalizations: global recoding and local recoding. With global recoding [13, 8, 3, 11, 7, 16, 4] all values of an attribute come from the same domain level in the hierarchy. In other words, all values come from the values in the same level in the generalization hierarchy. For example, all values in attribute job are in the lowest level (i.e. clerk, manager, factory worker and technical supporter), or all are in the top level (i.e. *). For example, a global recoding of Table 1 is Table 2 . One advantage is that an anonymous view has uniform domains. But, it may lose more information, compared with local recoding (which will be discussed next), because it suffers from over-generalization.
Under the scheme of local recoding [14, 13, 1, 10, 6, 5, 19] , values may be generalized to different levels in the domain. For example, Table 3 is a (0.5, 2)-anonymous table by local recoding. In fact, one can say that local recoding is a more general model and global recoding is a special case of local recoding. Note that, in the example, known values are replaced by unknown values (*). This is called suppression, which is one special case of generalization, which is in turn one of the ways of recoding.
It is easy to check that generalizing data to form QID-EC's in a released table is one possible way to achieve (α, k)-anonymity. However, it is not the only possible way, and we shall describe another method in the next section.
The lossy join approach
In recent work, it has been found that lossy join of multiple tables is useful in privacy-preserving data publishing [18, 15] Table 6 . SS Table   a join attribute are published, the join of the two tables can be lossy and this lossy join helps to conceal the private information.
In this paper, we make use of the idea of lossy join to derive a new mechanism for achieving a similar privacy preservation target as (α, k)-anonymization. Let us take a look at an example in Table 1 . A (0.5, 2)-anonymization is given in Table 3 . From this Tables 5 and 6 . The two tables share the attribute of ClassID. If we join these two tables by the ClassID, it is easy to see that the join is lossy and it is not possible to derive the table Temp after the join. The result of joining the two tables is given in Table 7 . From the lossy join, each individual is linked to at least 2 values in the sensitive attribute. Therefore, the required privacy of individual can be guaranteed. Also, in the joined table, for each individual, there are at least 2 individuals that are linked to the same bag B of sensitive values, such that in terms of the sensitive values, they are not distinguishable. For example, the first record in the raw table (QID = (clerk, 1975, 4350) ) is linked to bag {HIV,flu}. We find that the second individual (QID = (manager, 1955, 4350)) is also linked to the same bag B of sensitive values. This is the goal of k-anonymity for the protection of sensitive values.
Contribution
[17] proposed to generate one generalized table which satisfies (α, k)-anonymity. Since the table is generalized, the data in the table is distorted. In this paper, we generalize the definition of (α, k)-anonymity to allow for the generation of two tables instead of one generalized table. In this way, the privacy protection for (α, k)-anonymity can be achieved with less distortion. In the two tables, one [17, 18] in the experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4, we re-visit (α, k)-anonymity and propose a genearlization model of (α, k)-anonymity. In Section 5, we describe how the lossy join can be adapted to the generalized (α, k)-anonymity model. We propose an algorithm which generates two tables satisfying (α, k)-anonymity in Section 6. A systematic performance study is reported in Section 7. The paper is concluded in Section 8.
Generalized (α, k)-anonymity
Let us re-examine the objectives of (α, k)-anonymity. With k-anonymity, we want to make sure that when an individual is mapped to some sensitive values, at least k − 1 other individuals are also mapped to the same sensitive values. Let B be a bag of these sensitive values. For example, consider an individual with QID=(clerk, 1975, 4350) in Table 1 . With 2-anonymity, since s/he is mapped to the first and the second tuple in Table 3 , s/he is mapped to a bag B = {HIV, f lu}. There is another individual with QID=(manager, 1955, 4350) in Table 1 that also is mapped to the same bag B = {HIV, f lu} in Table 3 . (α, k)-anonymity further ensures that no sensitive value is sufficiently dominating in B so that an individual cannot be linked to any sensitive value in B with a high confidence. For instance, with α = 0.5, since B contains HIV and f lu, the frequency (in fraction) of each value in B is at most 0.5. Based on this observation, we generalize the definition of (α, k)-anonymity as follows: (SS table) , containing the QID-EC ID and the sensitive attributes. The released tables are annotated with the remark that each tuple in each of the two published table corresponds to one record in the original single table. This is to ensure that a user will not mistakenly join the two tables and assume that the join result corresponds to the original table.
The schema of the non-sensitive table (NSS table) is shown as follows, where Class ID corresponds to QID-EC ID.
Original QID attributes
Class ID
The schema of the sensitive table (SS table) is shown as follows.
Class ID Sensitive attribute
Let us consider the example in Table 1 again. We propose that Table 5 (NSS)  and Table 6 (SS) can be published as the anonymized data.
Theorem 1. The resulting published tables N SS and SS satisfy generalized (α, k)-anonymity.
Proof: Given the QID information of individuals in a table T I (which we assume that an attacker may possess) and the anonymized Table T A (e.g. Table 3 ), we can "join" the two tables by matching each QID in T A to its anonymized equivalence class and obtain a table T IA . Since T A satisfies (α, k)-anonymity, when the QID of an individual is linked to a bag B of values in the sensitive attribute, at least k − 1 other QID's of other individuals are also linked to B. In addition, the frequency (in fraction) of any sensitive value in B is no more than α. Now, suppose the adversary is given tables NSS and SS. Equipped with only table T I , an adversary must join the tables NSS and SS on their common attribute in an attempt to link the QID's to the sensitive values. Let the join result be table T A , such as Table 7 . Consider any QID-EC with class ID X. Let B X be the bag of sensitive values that X is linked to in T A and suppose there are a tuples in T A belonging to X. In Table T A , there will be a 2 tuples generated for X. In Table T This shows that the privacy protection provided by the single anonymized table T A is no stronger than that provided by the NSS and SS tables in terms of (α, k)-anonymity. Since T A satisfies (α, k)-anonymity, tables NSS and SS also satisfy (α, k)-anonymity.
The example shown in Tables 3 to 7 demonstrates the ideas in the proof above. If we publish Tables 5 and 6 , we can achieve similar privacy preservation objectives as if we publish Table 3 only.
Algorithm
Our method includes the following steps. This results in the SS table.
Construct an (α, k)-anonymous
The top-down approach has been found to be highly effective in k-anonymization [4] . In this approach, the table is first totally anonymized to the unknown values, and then attributes are specialized one at a time until we hit a point where the resulting table violates (α, k)-anonymity. We shall adopt the top-down approach in [17] to tackle the first step of (α, k)-anonymization in the above. The idea of the algorithm is to first generalize all tuples completely so that, initially, all tuples are generalized to one equivalence class. Then, some values in the dataset are specialized in iterations. During the specialization, we must maintain (α, k)-anonymity. The process continues until we cannot specialize the tuples anymore without violating (α, k)-anonymity. The pseudo-code of the top-down approach is shown in Algorithm 1. for all P ∈ S do 7:
specialize all tuples in P one level down in the generalization hierarchy such that a number of specialized child nodes are formed 8:
unspecialize the nodes which do not satisfy (α, k)-anonymity by moving the tuples back to the parent node 9:
if the parent P does not satisfy (α, k)-anonymity then 10:
unspecialize some tuples in the remaining child nodes so that the parent P satisfies (α, k)-anonymity 11:
for all non-empty branches B of P , do S ← S ∪ {B} 12:
Experimental Results
The system platform we used is: Windows XP OS, Microsoft SQL Server 2000, Intel Celeron CPU 2.66GHz, 256MB Memory, 80G Hard disk. We implemented our proposed algorithm, the (α, k)-anonymity based privacy preservation by lossy join, in C/C++ language. Let us denote it by Alpha(Lossy). We compared the proposed lossy-join algorithm with two algorithms in the literature. One is the original algorithm of (α, k)-anonymity [17] which generalizes the QID and forms one generalized table only. Let us denote the algorithm by Alpha. The other algorithm is the anatomy algorithm which makes use of the lossy join for the anonymization [18] . Let us denote the algorithm by Anatomy. Anatomy also generates two tables with a similar strategy of separating the sensitive data and the QID data. However, the goal of Anatomy is to create QID-EC's which satisfy the l-diversity requirement, without precaution in creating QID-EC's that also minimizes the effective distortion to the QID values. In other words, Anatomy does not consider the minimization of the variations in the QID values in each QID-EC when two tables are released. Alpha(Lossy) takes care of this issue by the top-down anonymization algorithm and therefore results in less data distortion.
The source code of this algorithm can be obtained from the author's website http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/∼taoyf/paper/vldb06.html. In our experiments, we make some modifications on the ST files generated by the original anatomy algorithm such that ST table can be loaded into the Microsoft SQL Server 2000.
Similar to [4, 8, 17] , we adopted the adult data set for the experiment, which can be downloaded in the UCIrvine Machine Learning Repository (http://www.ics.uci.edu/∼mlearn/MLRepository.html). We eliminated the records with unknown values in this data set. The resulting data set contains 45,222 tuples. Nine of the attributes were chosen in our experiments, as shown in Table  8 . By default, we set k = 2 and α = 0.33. In Table 8 , we set the first eight attributes and the last attribute as the quasi-identifer and the sensitive attribute, respectively.
We compare the algorithms in terms of effectiveness for aggregate queries. Similar to [18] , the effectiveness of aggregate query is defined to be its average relative error in answering a query of the following form. where |A| is the domain size of A. If the value of s is set higher, the selection conditions in pred(A) will be more. We compare the anonymized tables generated by different algorithms in terms of average relative error, which is defined as follows. We perform the aggregate query with the original data set, called Original. Let us call the count obtained above act. We execute the aggregate query with the anonymized data set as follows. As algorithm Alpha(Lossy) and algorithm Anatomy generates two tables, namely NSS and SS, we perform the query as follows. Let us call the count obtained above est. As algorithm Alpha generates one anonymized table, we perform the first query by replacing Unknown-Microdata with the anonymized or generalized data. Then, we define the relative error to be |act − est|/act, where act is its actual count derived from the original, and est the estimated count computed from the anonymized table. In our experiments, we compare all algorithms by varying the following factors: (1) the number of QID-attributes d; (2) query dimensionality qd; (3) selectivity s and (4) dataset cardinality n.
For each setting, we performed 1000 queries on the anonymized tables and then reported the average query accuracy. By default, we set qd = 4, s = 0.05 and n = 45222. As we adopt the first eight attributes in Table 8 as the quasiidentifier, the default value of d is 8.
We study the effect of the number of QI-attributes as shown in Figure 2 . The average relative error remains unchanged. Also, algorithm Alpha(Lossy) gives a lower average relative error compared with algorithm Anatomy and algorithm Alpha. This is because algorithm Alpha(Lossy) considers the minimization step of the distortion for the anonymization but algorithm Anatomy does not. Also, algorithm Alpha(Lossy) does not generalize the table but algorithm Alpha generalize the table, which makes the average relative error higher. On average, algorithm Anatomy gives lower average relative error compared with algorithm Alpha. The reason is similar. Algorithm Alpha generalizes the table, which distort the data much, but algorithm Anatomy does not.
We also studied the effect of query dimensionality qd as shown in Figure 3 . Similarly, even though the average relative error of algorithm Alpha(Lossy) is smaller than that of algorithm Anatomy and algorithm Alpha, qd had little effect on the average relative error.
We also varied the selectivity s as shown in Figure 4 and found that the average relative error of all algorithms decreases when s increases. This is because, when s is larger, each attribute in the aggregate query involves more value matches. That means the actual count is larger. Note that the actual count is the denominator of the average relative error. Besides, if the generalized values in the anonymized table match more aggregate values in the query, the estimated count will be more accurate. Thus, the overall average relative error decreases when s increases. Figure 5 shows the average relative error against the data set cardinality n. We found that the average relative error of all algorithms decreases slightly when n increases. This is because, when n is larger, there is more chance that a tuple can be matched with an existing tuple in the data without much generalization. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an (α, k)-anonymity based privacy preservation mechanism that reduce information loss by the use of lossy join. Instead of one generalized table, we generate two tables with a sharing attribute called ClassID, which corresponds to a unique identifier of an "equivalence class". One table contains the detailed information of the quasi-identifier and ClassID, and the other table contains ClassID and the sensitive attribute. By avoiding the generalization of the quasi-identifier in the first table, we achieve less information loss. We conducted some experiments and verified the improvement on information loss.
